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Abstract—Linear queries can be submitted to a server
containing private data. The server provides a response to
the queries systematically corrupted using an additive noise
to preserve the privacy of those whose data is stored on the
server. The measure of privacy is inversely proportional to the
trace of the Fisher information matrix. It is assumed that an
adversary can inject a false bias to the responses. The measure
of the security, capturing the ease of detecting the presence of
the false data injection, is the sensitivity of the Kullback-Leiber
divergence to the additive bias. An optimization problem for
balancing privacy and security is proposed and subsequently
solved. It is shown that the level of guaranteed privacy times
the level of security equals a constant. Therefore, by increasing
the level of privacy, the security guarantees can only be
weakened and vice versa. Similar results are developed under
the differential privacy framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various frameworks, such as differential privacy [1], have
been introduced to protect the privacy of individuals whose
data is stored in online databases. These methods most often
rely on the addition of noises with Laplace or Gaussian
distributions to the outcome of queries on the databases
containing the private information. More recently, differential
privacy has found its way to control systems and signal
processing [2]–[5]. In addition to differential privacy, in-
formation theoretic methods (using mutual information or
Fisher information as a measure of privacy) have been also
developed within the control and estimation community for
preserving the privacy of individuals [6]–[8]. These methods
also rely on the addition of noises which can be tailored for
the specific problem at hand in order to protect the private
data.
Although privacy preserving, the additive noise might
also make it harder for an outsider to be able to use
the reported data for identifying malicious behavior. For
instance, in the smart meter privacy examples in [6], [7],
a battery (which can be modeled as an additive noise with
bounded support) is being used to mask the consumption
patterns of the household. This ensures the privacy of the
household. However, the battery operation will also makes
it hard for the power authority to learn about the presence
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of malicious agents based on the provided smart meter data.
This is because deviations of the smart meter readings from
the power authority’s expectations (formed on the basis of
historical data or models of household consumption) can
be attributed equally to the implemented privacy-preserving
mechanism or a malicious entity. A systematic analysis of
the trade-off between privacy and security is the topic of this
paper.
Specifically, a problem setup is considered in which every-
one can submit linear queries to an online server containing
a vector of private data. The server, in return, provides a sys-
tematically corrupted response to the submitted queries. The
corruption involves using an additive noise to preserve the
privacy of the entries of the database, i.e., the aforementioned
vector of private data. The server determines the statistics of
the noise so that estimation error of the vector of private
data is maximized under a constraint on the quality of the
supplied response, captured by the variance of the additive
noise. Noting that the estimation error of the private vector
is a function of policy used for generating the estimate, the
Crame´r-Rao bound [9, p. 169] is used to develop a universal
measure of privacy which is inversely proportional to the
trace of the Fisher information matrix. This measure of
privacy is independent of the actions of the eavesdropper
and is thus universal. It is assumed that an adversary can
inject a bias to the server’s response. The ability of users to
be able to detect the presence of a bias (and thus raising a
security alarm) is related to the Kullback-Leiber divergence
of the output distribution with and without the additive
bias. This provides a measure of security. The choice is
motivated by the Chernoff-Stein Lemma (see, e.g., [10])
relating the probability of false negative (in the sense that a
false bias injection attack escaping undetected) when using
likelihood ratio hypothesis testing is a decreasing function
of the Kullback-Leiber divergence of the output distribution
with and without the additive bias. An optimization problem
for balancing between privacy and security is proposed and
solved. The solution in fact shows that the level of guaranteed
privacy times the level of security is upper bounded by a
constant. Therefore, by increasing the level of privacy, the
security guarantees weaken and vice versa. This observation
can be generalized to any distribution in fact and is thus
a fundamental property of the framework. Subsequently the
differential privacy framework is studied for which the same
limitation is also observed.
Note that the use of Fisher information as a measure of
privacy is not novel [7], [11], [12]; however, a systematic
method for balancing privacy and security is completely
missing from the literature. This is the topic of the current
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paper.
Recently, in [13], it was shown that differential privacy
noise can prevent detection of integrity attack in dynamical
systems. This is because the additive noise of differential
privacy provides new avenues for an attacker to inject false
information without raising suspicion. The results of this
paper, although having similar interpretations, are different
from [13]. Most importantly, using the Fisher information as
a measure of privacy and the Kullback-Leiber divergence as
a measure of security, we can develop a more fundamental
understanding of the trade-off between security and privacy
without restricting the framework to differential privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, the
problem formulation introducing the measures of privacy and
security is presented in Section II. The results capturing the
trade-off between privacy and security are then developed in
Section III. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the communication block diagram in Figure 2.
A trustworthy server has access to a vector x ∈ X ⊆ Rn
whose entries must be kept private. Any agent, including
those with an interest on infringing on the privacy of the
individuals whose data is stored on the server, can submit a
linear query of the form Cx to the server with observation
matrix C ∈ Rm×n.
Assumption 1: C has full row rank.
The server returns a response to the query of the form
z = Cx+w, where w ∈ Rm is an additive privacy-preserving
noise with probability density function γ : Rm → R≥0.
Assumption 2: γ is twice continuously differentiable and
supp(γ) := {w ∈ Rm | γ(w) > 0} may only differ from Rm
over a Lebesgue measure zero set.
These are technical assumptions that allow us to efficiently
capture the optimal trade-off between security and privacy.
The first part of Assumption 2 simplifies the search for
the optimal privacy-preserving policy by allowing the use
of tools available from the calculus of variations [14].
The second part of Assumption 2 ensures that the Fisher
information matrix is well-defined and its trace is a convex
function of γ [12]. The set of all such probability density
functions is denoted by Γ.
A. Measure of Privacy
In this paper, the Fisher information is utilized as a
measure of privacy. In fact, the server aims at increasing
P(γ) := 1/Tr(WI), (1)
where the weighting matrix W is a positive definite matrix
and I is the Fisher information matrix defined as
I :=
∫
∂ log(γ(w))
∂w
∂ log(γ(w))
∂w
>
γ(w)dw.
Note that the Fisher information matrix is a function of
the probability density function γ. This measure has been
recently utilized within privacy literature; see, e.g, [7], [12].
The motivation behind this selection is given in what follows.
The server wishes to keep the entries of the vector x
private. Therefore, it aims to select a probability density
function γ ∈ Γ to maximize E{‖Πx(x − xˆ(y))‖22}, where
Πx is a weighting matrix and xˆ(y) is an estimator that an
eavesdropper may use to estimate the value of the vector x
based on the received message y.
Noting that the term E{‖Πx(x − xˆ(y))‖22} is a function
of xˆ(y), which makes the privacy measure depending on the
eavesdropper (whose actions may not be known in advance),
a lower bound of this term based on the Fisher information
matrix is optimized. Using the Crame´r-Rao bound [15],
under mild assumptions, it can be shown that
E{‖Πx(x−xˆ(y))‖22} =Tr(Π>x ΠxE{(x−xˆ(y))(x−xˆ(y))>})
≥Tr(Π>x Πx((g(x)− x)(g(x)− x)>
+G(x)I†xG(x)>))
≥Tr(Π>x Πx(g(x)− x)(g(x)− x)>)
+ Tr(Π>x ΠxI†x)λmin(G(x)>G(x))
where g(x) = E{xˆ(y)}, G(x) is the Jacobian of g(x),
Ix = C>IC, and X† denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudo-
inverse of any matrix X . Note that, if G(x) is a full rank
matrix (e.g., for all unbiased estimators), Tr(Π>x ΠxI†x) can
be utilized as a measure of privacy that is independent of
the behavior of the adversary. This is because by increasing
Tr(Π>x ΠxI†x), the estimation error also increases. Noting
that Tr(Π>x ΠxI†x) is not a concave function of γ, the
measure of privacy can be replaced with 1/Tr((Π>x Πx)
†Ix)
because1 Tr(Π>x ΠxI†x) ≥ 1/Tr((Π>x Πx)†Ix). Interestingly,
1/Tr((Π>x Πx)
†Ix) is a concave function of the probability
density function γ because Tr((Π>x Πx)
†Ix) is a convex
function [7]. Thus maximizing 1/Tr((Π>x Πx)
†Ix) is a more
computationally-friendly task. Note that, for this motivational
example, the weighting function in P is given by W =
C(Π>x Πx)
†C>.
Remark 1 (Worst-case analysis): In the preceeding dis-
cussion, it is assumed that G(x) is full rank, which although
sensible (as estimators, such as least mean square, meet this
condition), might not desirable. In [16], it was shown that
1/Tr(CC>I) can be proved to be a measure of privacy by
studying worst-case privacy violations. In worst-case privacy
attack, an eavesdropper has access to all the entries of the
vector x except one of them (the subject of the privacy
infringement or eavesdropping attack) and it would like to
infer the value of that entry based on the response to the
submitted query. In that case, the weighting function in P is
given by W = CC>.
B. Measure of Performance
Noting that the error E{‖Πx(x − xˆ(y))‖22} can be made
potentially unbounded (since there is no prior on x and
the server can add a Gaussian noise with increasing co-
variance), the server also aims at maintaining a sensible level
1Note that, for any non-zero semi-definite matrixA, it can be deduced that
Tr(A†)Tr(A) ≥ Tr(A†A) ≥ 1 while implies that Tr(A) ≥ 1/Tr(A†).
Cx +
Cx
w
+
d
y = Cx+ w + Fd
Fig. 1. Communication diagram.
of performance by enforcing that
Q(γ) := E{‖y − Cx‖22} (2)
remains below a certain level η, i.e., it is desired that the
variance of the probability density function γ is less than
the provided upper bound by ensuring that∫
w>wγ(w) ≤ η.
C. Measure of Security
The communication channel can be infiltrated by an ad-
versary, which may inject the bias d ∈ Rp. Thus, the final
output is given by y = Cx+w+Fd. Therefore, the sever may
also wish to make it possible for potential users to identify
bias injection attacks performed by an adversary (to raise an
alarm). This can be achieved by enforcing a constraint on an
appropriately selected measure of security.
In this paper, the sensitivity of Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence between the probability density functions γ(y − Cx)
and γ(y −Cx− Fd) is used as a measure of security. This
shows that how easy it is for to distinguish between the
probability density functions γ(y−Cx) and γ(y−Cx−Fd)
for small offset term d (which an adversary may use to avoid
being detected). Therefore, the measure of security is given
by
S(γ) := min
ξ∈Rp
lim
d=%ξ,%→0
KL
‖d‖22
,
where
KL :=
∫
γ(y − Cx) log
(
γ(y − Cx)
γ(y − Cx− Fd)
)
dy.
In this framework, it is desired to ensure that S(γ) ≥ α,
where α > 0 is an appropriately selected constant.
This choice is motivated by that, at least for discrete
random variables, it can be proved that the probability
of false negative in the sense that a bias injection attack
remains undetected when using likelihood ratio hypothesis
testing is a decreasing function of KL [10, Chernoff-Stein
Lemma]. Although such a result may not hold in general,
this observation can be used a motivation for the use of
the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a measure of security.
Thus, to keep the probability of false negatives small, a
constraint of the form KL/‖d‖22 ≥ α. Note that KL grows
as a function of d so a scaled version of the Kullback-
Leibler divergence KL/‖d‖22 is considered. Considering that
the adversary intends to not be detected (and the fact that
the identification becomes easier as ‖d‖ grows), it would be
of interest to study small bias vectors d.
D. Balancing Privacy and Security
With the definitions of the measures of privacy and secu-
rity in hand, it is now time to pose the problem mathemati-
cally.
Problem 1: Find privacy preserving policy
γ∗ ∈ arg max
γ∈Γ
P(γ), (3a)
s.t. S(γ) ≥ α, (3b)
Q(γ) ≤ η. (3c)
A popular framework for studying privacy is differen-
tial privacy; see, e.g., [17]. The server’s response is -
differentially private if
P{y ∈ Y|x′} ≤ exp()P{y ∈ Y|x} (4)
for all x, x′ ∈ X that are only different in maximum on entry
and Y is a Lebesgue-measurable subset of Rm.
Problem 2: Find -differentially private γ∗ ∈ Γ such that
S(γ) ≥ α.
Studying Problem 2 allows us to see if we can observe the
same results as in [13] within this setup. Furthermore, it can
be investigated that if such results are in agreement with the
optimal additive noise extracted from solving Problem 1.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The first result of this paper, formalized in the following
theorem, states that the Gaussian additive noise with an
appropriately selected co-variance matrix provides the best
balance between privacy and security requirements according
to Problem 1.
Theorem 1: The solution to Problem 1 is given by
γ∗(w) =
1√
det(2piVww)
exp
(
− 1
2
w>V −1www
)
,
where
Vww =
η
Tr(W 1/2)
W 1/2,
if Tr(W 1/2)λmin(F>W−1/2F ) ≥ 2ηα.
Proof: By eliminating the security constraint, Prob-
lem 1 can be relaxed into
γ∗ ∈ arg min
γ∈Γ
Tr(WI), (5a)
s.t. Q(γ) ≤ η. (5b)
Note that the duality gap in (5) is zero [18]. Therefore, the
constraint on the variance can be added to the cost function
using a Lagrange multiplier, which transforms the problem
into
max
λ≥0
min
γ∈Γ
Tr(WI) + λ(Q(γ)− η). (6)
Following the same line of reasoning as in [12], the solution
of the inner problem in (6) is given by γ∗(w) = u(w)2,
where
Tr(WD2u(w))
+(µ− (λ/4)w>w)u(w) = 0, w ∈ W,
u(w) = 0, w ∈ ∂W,
u(w) 6= 0, w ∈ intW,∫
w∈W u(w)
2dw = 1.
(7)
Note that the cost function and the constraint set are convex,
the stationarity condition in (7) is sufficient for optimality.
Further, if multiple density functions satisfy the conditions,
they all exhibit the same cost. It can be shown that the
following satisfies the stationarity condition:
u(w) =
1
4
√
det(2piV )
exp
(
− 1
4
w>V −1w
)
,
where V = W 1/2/
√
λ. This shows that
min
γ∈Γ
Tr(WI) + λ(Q(γ)− η) = Tr(WV −1) + λ(Tr(V )− η).
Therefore, the outer optimization problem in (6) can be
rewritten as
max
λ≥0
2Tr(W 1/2)
√
λ− λη,
and as a result λ∗ = Tr(W 1/2)2/η2. Using [19], it can be
shown that
lim
d=%ξ,%→0
KL
‖d‖22
=
1
2
ξ>Idξ
ξ>ξ
.
where Id := F>IF . Thus,
S(γ) = min
ξ∈Rp
lim
d=%ξ,%→0
KL
‖d‖22
=
1
2
λmin(Id)
For γ∗, it can be seen that
Id =
√
λ∗F>W−1/2F = Tr(W 1/2)F>W−1/2F/η.
If S(γ) = (1/2)λmin(Id) ≥ α, the solution of (5) is also a
solution of (6). This concludes the proof.
Theorem 1 presents the solution of Problem 1 in the case
where the constraint Q(γ) ≤ η is active and S(γ) ≥ α is
inactive. The following theorem extends this results to the
case where the constraint S(γ) ≥ α is active and Q(γ) ≤ η
is inactive.
Theorem 2: Let
V := arg min
X0
Tr(WX), (8a)
s.t. F>XF  2αI. (8b)
The solution to Problem 1 is given by
γ(w) =
1√
det(2piVww)
exp
(
− 1
2
w>V −1www
)
(9)
if there exists V −1ww ∈ V such that Tr(Vww) ≤ η.
Proof: Note that Id = F>IF . Assume that each
I  0 is realizable, i.e., there exists γ(w) that results in it.
Thus, Problem 1 can be transformed into the semi-definite
program in (8). It remains to find a density function that has
a Fisher information equal to the solution of (8). This is in
fact possible using a multivariate normal distribution with
covariance matrix I−1. This concludes the proof.
For scalar queries, such as averaging, the solution to
Problem 1 can be greatly simplified. This is shown in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1: For scalar queries (i.e., m = 1), the solution
to Problem 1 is given by
γ(w) =
1√
2piVww
exp
(
− w
2
2Vww
)
, (10)
where
Vww =
{
η, η ≤ λmin(F>F )/α,
1/α, otherwise.
Proof: If η ≤ λmin(F>F )/α, the results of Theorem 1
can be used. Otherwise, the results of Theorem 2 should be
utilized in which case it can be seen that Tr(WX) = WX
(since both X and W are scalars) and F>XF = (F>F )X
(again because X is a scalar). Hence, the optimization prob-
lem in (8) can be transformed into V −1ww ∈ arg minX≥αX .
Thus, Vww = 1/α. This concludes the proof.
Corollary 2: For the optimal probability density function
in Corollary 1, S(γ)P(γ) = λmin(F>F )/(2W ).
Proof: For the optimal policy in Corollary 1, it can
be seen that KL = 12 (Fd)2V −1ww , and, as a result, S(γ) =
1
2λmin(F
>F )/Vww. On the other hand, P(γ) = Vww/W .
Proposition 2 shows that by increasing P(γ) to achieve a
higher privacy guarantee, S(γ) decreases, which makes the
system more vulnerable to bias injection attacks. In fact, in
lay terms, it can be expressed that
“privacy× security = constant”. (?)
In what follows, it is shown that Corollary 2 and its
interpretation in (?) hold for any probability density func-
tion γ(w) if m = 1 (and not necessarily the solution of
Problem 1)
Proposition 1 (Trade-off between Privacy and Security):
For m = 1, S(γ)P(γ) = λmin(F>F )/(2W ) for any γ ∈ Γ.
Proof: For any density function, it can be seen that
S(γ) = lim
d=%ξ,%→0
KL
‖d‖22
=
1
2
ξ>F>IFξ
ξ>ξ
=
1
2
λmin(F
>IF ).
Thus,P(γ)S(γ) = λmin(F>IF )/(2Tr(WI)). For m = 1, it
can be shown that P(γ)S(γ) = λmin(F>F )/(2W ) because
I is scalar.
Figure 2 illustrates the trade-off between measure of
privacy P(γ) for the optimal policy in Corollary 1 versus
the lower bound on the measure of security α for various
quality of response guarantees η. In this numerical example,
m = 1, F = 1, and W = 1. The plateau on the achievable
privacy guarantee for small values of α is caused by the
constraint on the quality of measurement Q(γ). The gray
area denotes the cases for which P(γ)α ≤ 1. All these cases
are achievable for various values of η. Note that this not
in contrast with the results of Propositions 2 and 1 as they
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Fig. 2. The trade-off between measure of privacy P(γ) for the optimal
policy in Corollary 1 versus the lower bound on the measure of security
α for various response quality guarantees η = 1 (solid red ), η = 2
(solid red ), and η = 4 (solid green ). The plateau on the achievable
privacy guarantee for small α is caused by the constraint on the quality of
measurement Q(γ). The gray area denotes the cases for which P(γ)α ≤ 1.
explore P(γ)S(γ) (which is not necessarily equal to P(γ)α
as the constraint S(γ) ≥ α is not always active).
Now, we are ready to explore the solution of Problem 2
regarding the balance between privacy and security in the
differential privacy framework.
Theorem 3: For scalar problems, i.e., m = 1, and  ≥
∆
√
2α, the solution to Problem 2 is given by
γ(w) =
1
2∆/
exp
(
− |w|
∆/
)
, (11)
where ∆ := supx,x′∈X :‖x−x′‖0≤1 |C(x− x′)|.
Proof: Note that
p(y|x′)
p(y|x) = exp
( |y − Cx| − |y − Cx′|
∆/
)
≤ exp
( |C(x′ − x)|
∆/
)
≤ exp(), (12)
where the first inequality follows from that |y−Cx| = |y−
Cx + Cx′ − Cx′| ≤ |y − Cx′| + |C(x′ − x)|. Integrating
both sides of (12) concludes the proof. Furthermore, γ meets
Id = 2/∆2. Thus, Id ≥ 2α if and only if  ≥ ∆
√
2α.
For the -differentiallay private distribution in Theorem 3,
the following can be proved:
KL =
∫
1
2∆/
exp
(
− |y − Cx|
∆/
)
×
( |y − Cx− Fd|
∆/
− |y − Cx|
∆/
)
dy
=
∫
1
2∆/
exp
(
− |y¯|
∆/
)( |y¯ − Fd|
∆/
− |y¯|
∆/
)
dy¯
= exp(−|Fd|/∆)− 1 + |Fd|/∆.
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Fig. 3. The trade-off between measure of privacy 1/ and the measure
of security S(γ) for the differentially-private policy in Theorem 3.
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Fig. 4. The trade-off between measure of privacy 1/ and KL for the
differentially-private policy in Theorem 3.
Therefore
S(α) = min
ξ
lim
d=%ξ,%→0
KL
‖d‖22
=
λmin(F
>F )2
2∆2
.
This implies that by increasing the privacy guarantee (which
is inversely proportional to ), the security level decreases
and vice versa. This is a similar observation to that of (?).
Figure 3 illustrates the trade-off between measure of
privacy 1/ versus the measure of security S(γ) for the
differentially-private policy in Theorem 3. Here, m = 1,
∆ = 1, and F = 1. Recalling that S(γ) is motivated by
small biases d, we also explore KL for differentially-private
policies. This relationship is shown in Figure 4. Clearly, the
same trend regarding the inverse relationship of the privacy
and security can still be observed.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A framework was developed in which linear query can
be submitted to a server containing private data. The server
provides a response to the query corrupted using an additive
noise to preserve the privacy of those whose data is on
the server. It is shown that the level of guaranteed privacy
times the level of security is always upper bounded by a
constant and, as a result, higher privacy guarantees dictates
weakened security guarantees. Future work can focus on
dynamic problems.
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